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Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and Competition Policy 
Thomas L. Greaney
 Of the many elements animating structural change under health reform, Accountable 
Care Organizations (ACOs) have drawn the greatest attention.  Supported by scholarship from 
health policy experts and positioned as the Affordable Care Act‟s centerpiece for systemic 
reform, the concept came to represent a potential cure-all for the disorders plaguing American 
health care.  While the program, entitled the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), focuses 
on Medicare payment policy, its objectives extend much farther.   The ACO strategy entails 
regulatory interventions that at once aim to reshape the health care delivery system, improve 
outcomes, promote adoption of evidence based medicine and supportive technology, and create a 
platform for controlling costs under payment system reform.  
Ambitious aims to be sure. Implementation, however, has proved a wrenching process.  
Because the law entails seismic change requiring norm-shifting, institution building, and law 
reform, interest groups did not remain quiescent.   Moreover, the ACO strategy calls upon 
disparate governmental entities to cooperate (and in many cases, cede regulatory turf) and asks 
the private sector to respond responsibly to changes that are rife with possibilities for 
opportunistic behavior.  The regulatory undertaking itself is far reaching--perhaps 
unprecedented--in its goal of “nation building”: fostering institutions that will counter market 
failure and shift embedded incentives and practices in medicine.  Given the abject state of health 
care markets, a central question is whether implementing regulations and legal standards are 
adequate to achieve the hoped-for rationalization of health care delivery and financing.   
This article looks at the intersection of markets and regulation under the Affordable Care 
Act.  Specifically, it analyzes regulatory interventions under the MSSP designed to foster 
commercial market competition.  Assessing prospects for success, it advances several 
interrelated arguments.  First, in fulfilling the regulatory task of implementing the MSSP, 
regulators needed to be vigilant to protect against the potential that ACOs may have adverse on 
private markets.  It finds that because the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
was overly preoccupied with Medicare program issues and hyper-sensitive to criticism from 
powerful hospitals, the agency missed an important opportunity in its implementing regulations 
to prevent exacerbation of provider market power.  Because existing legal regimes, especially 
antitrust law, are severely constrained in their ability to deal with extant provider market power, 
regulation of ACOs requires a cross-platform regulatory approach that addresses market issues. 
 Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University School of 
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I. ACOs: Theory and Implementation 
The MSSP is one of several initiatives contained in the Affordable Care Act designed to  
implement “value-based purchasing,”  a reform strategy that “links payment more directly to the 
quality of care provided [and] is a strategy  that can help to transform the current payment 
system by rewarding providers for delivering high quality, efficient clinical care.”1 Section 3022 
of the ACA requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish the MSSP to 
encourage development of ACOs in Medicare.2  Although unmistakably designed to foster 
change in coordinating patient care for Medicare beneficiaries, the ACO strategy has broader 
goals.  Donald Berwick, former Director of CMS, often repeated the “triple aim” of the MSSP: 
(1) better care for individuals; (2) better health for populations; and (3) slower growth in costs 
through improvements in care.3  The concept of promoting organizations capable of being 
accountable for the quality and cost of the care they deliver, carries the endorsement of 
MedPAC4 and a number of academic and policy experts,5 but is not entirely novel. In many 
respects, the ACO is the latest in a long line of efforts to develop integrated delivery systems that 
bear financial responsibility for treatment decisions.6 Distinguishing the MSSP from other 
market-oriented strategies however is the program‟s objective of leveraging Medicare policy to 
transform health delivery and payment practices in the private sector. This link is the source of 
the program‟s considerable promise and its most vexing regulatory challenges.  
 The basic design of the MSSP enables provider organizations to share a percentage of the 
savings they achieve in delivering services to Medicare beneficiaries provided they 
1 CMS HOSPITAL PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE WORKGROUP ET AL., DEP‟T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES MEDICARE HOSPITAL VALUE-BASED 
PURCHASING PLAN 1 (2007), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/AcuteInpatientPPS/downloads/hospital_VBP_plan_issues_paper.pdf. 
2  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 395 (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ACA]. 
3  Donald M. Berwick, Launching Accountable Care Organizations—The Proposed Rule for the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. e32, e32 (2011). 
4 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, IMPROVING INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM
40-58 (2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun09_EntireReport.pdf (MedPAC is an 
independent Congressional Agency that advises Congress on issues affecting Medicare) [hereinafter 
MedPAC Report].  
5  Elliott S. Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward In Medicare, 28 HEALTH 
AFF. w219, w220-22 (2009), http://tdi.dartmouth.edu/documents/publications/HA%20Fisher-
McClellan%20art.pdf; Mark McClellan et al., A National Strategy To Put Accountable Care Into 
Practice, 29 HEALTH AFF. 982, 985-87 (2010), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/5/982.full.html; Stephen M. Shortell & Lawrence P. Casalino, 
Health Care Reform Requires Accountable Care Systems, 300 JAMA 95, 96-97 (2008); Stephen M. 
Shortell et al., How The Center For Medicare And Medicaid Innovation Should Test Accountable Care 
Organizations, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1293, 1294 (2010), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/7/1293.full.html.  
6  Policies encouraging integrated delivery of health services through managed care can be traced back to 
the work of Dr. Paul Elwood and others in the 1960s, which culminated in the passage of the Health 
Maintenance Act in 1973. 42 U.S.C. § 280(c) (1973) (requiring employers offering health insurance to 
offer an HMO option). See Robert I. Field, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY,
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 80-83 (2007).  
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meet quality performance standards.  To do so, ACOs will need to integrate delivery of services 
so as to improve the coordination of care reimbursed under Medicare‟s fee-for-service 
methodology, invest in infrastructure, and redesign care processes that promote high quality, 
efficient service and higher value care.7At bottom, the ACO model attempts to solve what 
Devers and Berenson call a “chicken and egg” problem underlying efforts to address health care 
costs.8 By one account, the core problem in the health care system lies with payment policies that 
reward volume rather than value; hence reform of provider payment should be the first order of 
business.  Others observe that it is impossible to change the payment system unless delivery 
system reform first produces organizations capable of handling an altered payment system. The 
MSSP attempts to tackle this policy quandary by addressing both problems simultaneously, 
offering financial rewards to providers that organize and reorient their practices to deliver 
seamless, high quality care. 
 Looked at from a market perspective, ACOs can be seen as an attempt to mitigate market 
and regulatory failures that pervade the financing and delivery of health care services.  Market 
imperfections including imperfect agency, information distortions and asymmetry, moral hazard 
and monopoly are widely recognized shortcomings that undermine consumer welfare in most 
commercial markets for health care products and services.9 The collateral effects of these 
conditions can be observed in the remarkably fragmented structure of provider markets. With 
physicians practicing primarily in solo practices or small groups10 and group practices often not 
coordinating across specialty lines or with inpatient facilities, care delivery is extraordinarily 
uncoordinated and episodic.11  Besides causing documented deficiencies in quality, fragmented 
markets have also worked to impair effective bargaining and comparative shopping.12  For 
example, the absence of vertical integration frustrates the capacity of managed care to negotiate 
for cost-effective bundles of services.  In hospital markets, most patients delegate choice to their 
7  Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,806-961 
(Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395) [hereinafter Final Rule].  
8  Kelly Devers & Robert Berenson, Can Accountable Care Organizations Improve the Value of Health 
Care by Solving the Cost and Quality Quandaries?, URBAN INSTITUTE (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411975_acountable_care_orgs.pdf. 
9  Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 
947 (1963) (“The failure of one or more of the competitive preconditions has as its most immediate and 
obvious consequence a reduction in welfare below that obtainable from existing resources and 
technology, in the sense of a failure to reach an optimal state in the sense of Pareto.”).  See generally
David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets, in 1B 
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1093, 1095 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) 
(describing market imperfections in health care); Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and 
Competition Policy: Antidote or Placebo? 89 OR. L. REV. 810, 817 (2011). 
10  Allison Liebhaber & Joy M. Grossman, Physicians Moving to Mid-Sized Single Specialty Practices, 
QUALITY & CARE DELIVERY TRACKING REPORT, Aug. 2007, at 1-2, available at
http://www.hschange.com/content/941/941.pdf. 
11 See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (Einer R. 
Elhauge, ed., 2010) [hereinafter Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care]. 
12 See Thomas L. Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational Fragmentation in Health Care, 71 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 217, 229 (2009). See also Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care 
Fragmentation and How to Fix It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE, 1 (Einer R. Elhauge, 
ed., 2010). 
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physicians who do not internalize the hospitals‟ costs of technology or excess capacity.  In this 
context, hospitals benefit more by competing for physician affiliation though various forms of 
nonprice competition than by economizing for the benefit of efficient contracting.  Regulation 
and government payment policies, which strongly influence the practices and norms in the 
private sector, also bear significant responsibility for market inefficiencies in health care.  Most 
notably, the longstanding reliance on fee-for-service methods of payment has spawned an ethos 
of provider payment that rewards volume and disincentivizes cost-benefit tradeoffs.13
ACOs under the MSSP Program 
 While the ACO strategy relies on flexibility in design and structure to accommodate local 
market conditions, the core concept envisions a local entity and a related set of providers, 
including primary care physicians, specialists, and hospitals that can be held accountable for the 
cost and quality of the entire continuum of care delivered to a defined population such as 
Medicare beneficiaries or subscribers to private insurance plans. 14  Payments to those entities 
can take the form of population-based reimbursements such as capitation, fee for service 
payments subject to agreed-upon shared savings when the ACOs costs fall below pre-established 
benchmarks, or other arrangements. Notably, the MSSP program adopts a “shared savings” 
approach under which participating ACOs share in cost reductions achieved compared to 
benchmark levels (what Medicare would have paid under fee for service payment for the ACOs 
beneficiaries).  ACO providers will continue to be paid under Medicare‟s fee-for-service 
methodologies but subject to a bonus structure designed to encourage economizing the total costs 
for their cohort of beneficiaries.  Thus, ACOs constitute an intermediary model for reform that 
does not require providers to assume insurance and technical risk for care provided to 
beneficiaries but still provides financial incentives to reorient delivery arrangements.15  As such 
the bonus-based shared savings model may ultimately prove to be a transitional model, one that 
facilitates the transition to a more complete assumption of financial responsibility.  For entities 
already prepared to accept such obligations, CMS has also established a pilot program for 
“Pioneer ACOs” that will employ prepaid population-based reimbursement methods such as 
capitation for selected ACOs that can demonstrate sufficient capabilities to manage this kind of 
risk.16
Although ACOs may involve a variety of structural configurations among providers, such 
as integrated delivery systems, primary care medical groups, hospital-based systems and virtual 
13 See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can Efficiency in Health Care Be Left to the Market?, 26 J. HEALTH POL.
POL‟Y & L. 967, 987 (2001). 
14  See Shortell & Casalino, supra note xx at; Elliot S. Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care: 
Moving Forward In Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. W219, W220 (2009), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/2/w219.full.html; MedPAC Report, supra note xx at 39.  
15  ROBERT A. BERENSON & RACHEL A. BURTON, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN MEDICARE 
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: A STATUS UPDATE 8-9 (2011), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412438-Accountable-Care-Organizations-in-Medicare-and-the-
Private-Sector.pdf (stating that the MSSP “puts providers in a position somewhere between being paid 
solely through volume-increasing fee-for service payments and operating within tightly managed, 
prospectively defined capitated budgets that place providers at full financial risk for all spending for their 
enrolled populations.”).
16  See Pioneer ACO Model, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID INNOVATION, 
http://innovations.cms.gov/initiatives/aco/pioneer/ (last visited date).  
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networks of physicians such as independent practice associations, designers of the model stress
that all accountable care organizations must have a strong base of primary care.17  That emphasis 
is well placed given the underlying defects in the way health care is delivered. Health economists 
and policy experts place much of the responsibility for cost and quality deficiencies in health 
care on the fragmented nature of the American system (more accurately, “non-system”).18 With 
most health professionals working in separate institutional settings with little collaboration, 
shared information, or common protocols, clinical decisions lack an effective mechanism to 
assess cost or value. Indeed, fragmentation served to undermine managed care‟s incentives to 
promote development of efficient delivery organizations. With physicians typically contracting 
with multiple payors, incentives to change practice styles or adopt other methods for controlling 
cost and improving quality by conforming to the protocols of any single payor are attenuated. As 
a result, fee-for-service payment, the predominant method of reimbursement in public and 
private insurance, neglects many of the services necessary for cost-effective care delivery.  For 
example, it fails to pay for care coordination and information exchanges, and undervalues other 
valuable services such as cognitive services and communications outside care encounters.19
While ACOs bear a family resemblance to health maintenance organizations in that they 
offer a network of providers which will have financial incentives to economize on care, there are 
significant differences.20 ACOs are controlled by providers rather than insurers and, unlike 
HMOs, beneficiaries are assigned to ACOs and do not actively select their plan.  Moreover, 
beneficiaries are permitted to utilize physicians outside the ACO to which they have been 
assigned.  As designed for Medicare beneficiaries under the MSSP, ACOs operate under a 
different incentive structure than HMOs.  ACOs can choose between two payment models. 
Under Track 1 (the “one-sided” payment model) the ACO will share in savings realized without 
the risk of sharing in any losses. 21 More experienced ACOs that are ready to share in losses with 
greater opportunity for reward may elect the two sided model under Track 2 which provides for 
higher sharing rates than would be available under the one-sided model, but require sharing 
losses that may occur.22 Finally, the MSSP initiative requires that CMS apply explicit and 
detailed quality metrics to ACOs and that it closely monitor their performance.23
The legislative history of the MSSP is limited.  Inclusion of the program in the new law 
was strongly influenced by the endorsement of the concept in 2009 by MedPAC,24 though the 
ultimate model adopted differs in some important respects.  For example, MedPAC proposed 
mandatory participation of at least one hospital in each ACO while the MSSP contains no such 
restriction.  Although the Act‟s limited legislative history affords no explanation for this 
departure, it probably reflects the drafters‟ perception that hospital participation may undermine 
17  Mark McClellan et al., supra note xx at 983 (2010). 
18 See generally Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care, supra note xx; Francis J. Crosson, Medicare: The 
Place To Start Delivery System Reform, 28 HEALTH AFF. w232, w232 (2009). 
19 See Greaney, supra note xx at 227; Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care 
Fragmentation, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE, supra note xx . 
20 See Berenson & Burton, supra note xx at 2. 
21  Final Rule, supra note xx at 67,904.  
22 Id.
23 Id. at 67,942. 
24  See generally MedPAC Report, supra note xx at 39-58.  
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ACOs ability to achieve savings by tackling excess hospital expenditures, commonly thought to 
be the most promising avenue for cost reductions.25
Two interconnected objectives underlying the design of the MSSP. Perhaps the most 
important consideration for the immediate goal reforming Medicare reimbursement is  the need 
to solve the “chicken and egg” dilemma discussed earlier. Congress recognized that it was 
essential to stimulate formation of organizations that could receive and distribute reimbursement 
and be responsible for the quality of care under the several new payment arrangements contained 
in the ACA and developing in the private sector.  Thus innovative programs in the ACA 
providing for bundled payment,26 value based purchasing,27 and other arrangements presuppose 
the formation of provider organizations that can assume the responsibilities for care coordination 
and internal governance and sharing of financial responsibilities.28 The second objective 
concerns  spillovers from the MSSP in the private sector.  Recognizing that ACOs were more 
likely to succeed and have transformative effects on the delivery system if they obtained 
acceptance by commercial insurers and employers, the architects of the MSSP were eager to 
encourage facilitation of private sector initiatives.29
Prospects for Success: Experience and Critiques 
The legislative origins of the Medicare Shared Savings Program can be traced to a law 
passed in 2000 establishing the Physicians Group Practice Demonstration (PGP) which enabled 
nine selected integrated physician groups and one physician hospital organization to keep a 
portion of the savings they generated in serving Medicare, beneficiaries with incentives to 
increase their share of savings based on a set of 32 quality measures. 30  Notably this experiment 
did not provide strong evidence that organizations like ACOs could readily achieve substantial 
savings despite the fact that the participants were relatively sophisticated medical groups 
experienced in providing integrated care.  Although all of the participants were able to improve 
the quality of the services they provided, only two participants lowered cost sufficiently to 
receive shared savings in all five years of the program, and three received no bonus in any year.31
Despite the disappointing results, these outcomes may not be predictive of the prospects for 
ACOs under the MSSP.  Incentives to change practice patterns in a short term program would 
need to be substantial to encourage substantial savings from providers. Moreover, inasmuch as 
25  Andrew A. Kasper, Antitrust Review of Accountable Care Organizations: An Assessment of FTC and 
DOJ’s Relaxed Approach to Regulating Physician-Hospital Networks, 90 N.C. L. REV. 203, 214 (2011). 
26  ACA § 3023. 
27  ACA §§ 3001, 3006, 10301, 10335. 
28 See Kasper supra note xx at 214 (“Congress appears to have viewed the ACO program and hospital-
physician bundled payment programs as intimately related, placing the payment-bundling pilot program 
immediately after the Shared Savings Program in the bill.”). 
29 See e.g., Final Rule, supra note xx at 76 (noting a need to “harmonize” MSSP eligibility rules with 
requirements of antitrust law applicable to ACOs operating in the private sector). 
30  Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-509 (2000). 
31  Kathleen K. Sebelius, Report to Congress: Physician Group Practice Demonstration Evaluation 
Report, 2009, www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/RTC_Sebelius; Gail Wilensky, Lessons from the 
Physician Group Practice Demonstration — A Sobering Reflection, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1659, 1660 
(2011), available at www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1110185. 
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fee-for-service payment (both in Medicare and private insurance plans) continued to reward 
higher volume, it was probably unrealistic to expect providers to radically change their business 
models in a pilot program.32
ACO developers face formidable obstacles in putting the pieces together.  For example, 
integrating and collectivizing medical practices entails redistributing incomes among 
providers—a process certain to entail substantial frictions.33  Because hospital-related wasteful 
and unnecessary care constitutes the largest avoidable costs in health care,34 hospitals should be 
focus of ACOs‟ cost-cutting strategy.  At the same time, hospitals are most likely to have access 
to the capital necessary to fund start-up costs for ACOs and historically have been resistant to 
sharing control with physicians.35 Moreover, physicians face practical obstacles to reaching 
agreement among themselves. There are substantial income disparities among physicians,36 with 
primary care physicians earning far less than specialists who in some cases can reap sizeable 
profits from the provision of ancillary services.  Increased consolidation among specialty 
physicians37 confers substantial bargaining power that will make it difficult to reward primary 
care practitioners who under many ACO models serve as gatekeepers reducing the amount of 
unnecessary procedures and tests.  As one respected expert on physician-hospital relations put it, 
ACOs will find single specialty groups “as hard to absorb as gravel in the digestive tract.”38
Proponents of the ACO strategy argue forcefully that the experiment is the last best hope 
for a market-driven rationalization of the health care system. Jay Crosson, for example, contends 
that the ACO concept is “too vitally important to fail,” predicting that the likely alternative if 
ACOs do not take root could be indiscriminate, across-the-board cuts to provider payment rates. 
39 Optimistic observers suggest that ACOs will improve the dynamics of competition40 and may 
32  Berenson & Burton, supra note xx. 
33  Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible Partnerships Between Health 
Plans and Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 32, 35 (2011) (noting problems with income allocation among 
physician networks “doomed many provider-organizations in the past”).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 33 (“[F]or many hospital administrators, alignment is a code word for „physicians work for me 
and will do what I say.‟”). 
36  See Ya-Chen Tina Shih & Thomas R. Konrad, Factors Associated with the Income Distribution of 
Full-Time Physicians: A Quantile Regression Approach, 42 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1895, 1906-09 (2007). 
37 Hearing on Health Care Industry Consolidation Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on 
Ways and Means 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Martin Gaynor, Professor, Carnegie Mellon 
University) (noting the absence of nationwide data but observing concentration in physician specialty 
markets). See also Lawton Burns & Mark V. Pauly, Integrated Delivery Networks: A Detour on the Road 
to Integrated Health?, 21 HEALTH AFF. 128 (2002).  
38  Goldsmith, supra note xx at 35. 
39  F. Jay Crosson, The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever Its Growing Pains, the Concept Is Too 
Vitally Important to Fail, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1250, 1254 (2011). 
40  Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The End of Health Insurance Companies, N.Y TIMES OPINION PAGES
(Jan. 30, 2012, time), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/the-end-of-health-insurance-
companies/ (stating that ACOs offer “a better form of competition” because consumers are better able to 
choose physicians than deal with “a bewildering array of copayments, deductibles and annual out of 
pocket maximums” in selecting a health plan). See also Shortell et al., supra note xx. 
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ultimately displace private insurance altogether.41 Other prominent health policy experts are less 
sanguine about the compatibility of ACOs and a competition-driven marketplace, offering 
scenarios in which the failure of competition to restrain cost increases driven by dominant 
providers ultimately leads to rate regulation,42 or simply fail to achieve critical mass because of 
the intransigence of entrenched providers.43
The ACO Regulation 
On March 31, 2011, CMS released its proposed regulation for the MSSP.44  In addition, 
and as part of the inter-agency collaborative administrative process, other ACO-related 
guidelines were issued: CMS and HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) jointly issued a notice 
outlining proposals for waivers of certain Federal laws—the physician self-referral law, the anti-
kickback statute, and certain provisions of the civil monetary penalty law—in connection with 
the Shared Savings.45 The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice jointly 
issued a “Proposed Statement of Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations 
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program” (Antitrust Policy Statement), which 
announced safe harbors for less inclusive provider collaborations and a mandatory review 
process for larger ones.46 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a notice requesting 
comments regarding the need for guidance on participation by tax-exempt organizations in the 
Shared Savings Program through ACOs.47  Responding in part to the unfavorable response to the 
proposed rule,48 the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) added two additional 
programs before the comment period for the rule had closed.  It announced the Pioneer ACO 
Program49 which is designed for health care organizations and providers that experienced in 
coordinating care for patients across care settings, proposes terms that allow such provider 
41  Emanuel & Liebman, supra note xx at (predicting that “by 2010, the American health insurance will be 
extinct” as ACOs will replace private health insurance companies).
42 See e.g., Hearing on Health Care Industry Consolidation Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Ginsburg Testimony] (statement of Paul B. 
Ginsburg, President, Center for Studying Health System Change) (documenting increasing provider 
market power and concluding that ineffective market competition may lead to government rate review or 
rate setting); Clark C. Havighurst & Barak Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care, 89 
OR. L. REV. 847, 874 (2011) (citing rate regulation as possible remedy to hospital market dominance). 
43  Goldsmith, supra note xx at 35. 
44  Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,528, 19,528 
(Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Proposed Rule] (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1395). 
45  Waiver Designs in Connection With the Medicare Shared Savings Program and the Innovation Center, 
76 Fed. Reg. 19,655, (Apr. 7, 2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
46  Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations 
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,894, (Apr. 19, 2011) [hereinafter 
Proposed Antitrust Policy Statement]. 
47  I.R.S. Notice 2011-20, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-20.pdf. [hereinafter IRS 
Notice]. 
48 See infra notes xx and accompanying text. 
49 See supra note xx. The program announcement and application form may be found at 
http://innovations.cms.gov/areas-of-focus/seamless-and-coordinated-care-models/pioneer-aco. 
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groups to move more rapidly from a shared savings payment model to a population-based 
payment model “on a track consistent with, but separate from, the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program.”50   In addition, CMS established an Advance Payment Model for ACOs, which were 
designed to broaden the opportunity for smaller health care provider groups (specifically those 
that do not include inpatient facilities other than critical access hospitals) to participate in the 
MSSP by providing upfront payments to be recouped from future shared savings the ACOs 
earn.51
The proposed rule generated over 1300 comments many of which were highly critical.  
Provider groups were especially concerned with the extensive quality requirements CMS 
proposed to review ACO performance (65 separate measures); the imposition of “two sided risk” 
in the third year of operation; identification of assigned beneficiaries for whom the ACO would 
be held accountable for at the end of the year, after care had been delivered, instead of the 
beginning; the requirement that at least 50 percent of an ACO‟s primary care physicians be 
meaningful users of electronic health records.52  Although criticisms came from many quarters 
including some who argued the regulations were too lax or insufficiently supportive of rural and 
safety net interests, provider interest groups were the most vocal and pointed in their comments.  
The health industry trade press and policy experts echoed providers‟ critique, concluding that the 
burdensome and inapt regulatory structure proposed by CMS would doom the ACO initiative.53
To the surprise of some,54 CMS made some significant changes in its Final Rule in response to 
concerns expressed by commenters.  In addition, the FTC and Department of Justice, the Office 
of Inspector General and the Internal Revenue Service each amended their proposed policies in 
significant ways.  Together these changes seemed to mollify critics and prompted predictions 
that ACO program was “back on track.”55
50Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, Pioneer ACO Model available at
http://innovations.cms.gov/areas-of-focus/seamless-and-coordinated-care-models/pioneer-aco/. 
51 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, Advance Payment Model, available at 
http://innovations.cms.gov/areas-of-focus/seamless-and-coordinated-care-models/advance-payment/.  
52 See Berenson & Burton supra note xx at 1.  
53  Press reports ranged from critical to apoplectic. See e.g., Avik Roy, How Obamacare is Destroying 
Accountable Care Organizations, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2011/08/19/how-obamacare-is-destroying-accountable-care-
organizations/. 
54 See Phil Galewitz & Jenny Gold, HHS Releases Final Regulations For ACOs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/october/20/accountable-care-organization-
rules-regulations.aspx.  
55  N.C. Aizenman, Obama Administration Revises Medicare Rules For Coordinated Care, WASH. POST
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/obama-administration-revises-
medicare-rules-for-coordinated-care/2011/10/20/gIQAsT7W1L_story.html (stating new rule “greeted 
with jubilation by groups representing doctors and hospitals”); Noam M. Levy, Changes seek to save key 
aspect of healthcare law, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/20/nation/la-
na-medicare-partnerships-20111021. 
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The Final Rule modifies the Proposed Rule in a number of important respects. While by 
no means exhaustive, the following changes are particularly germane to the market issues 
discussed in this paper. 
Reduced quality and structural requirements. The Final Rule reduced requirements for 
“meaningful use” of electronic health records, lowered the number of performance measures for 
bonus eligibility was reduced from 65 to 33 and eased other quality reporting requirements. 56 In 
addition, ACOs will now be allowed to add or subtract providers within the performance period. 
Antitrust Review. The Final Rule withdraws a requirement that ACOs with dominant 
provider participants obtain prior antitrust clearance from the FTC or Department of Justice as a 
condition of approval for participation in the MSSP.57
Beneficiary assignment. Rather than assign beneficiaries retrospectively to ACOs, the 
Final Rule adopts a “step-wise” approach that will provide ACOs will a timely list with quarterly 
updates of the beneficiaries that are likely to be attributed, enabling ACOs to reach out to 
beneficiaries, while reconciling the list at the end of the year so that the ACO is not held 
responsible for those beneficiaries who shifted their care to other providers during the year. 58
Governance.  The Final Rule relaxed requirements that participants (providers and 
suppliers) have proportionate control over the organizations. The IRS has indicated that it will 
relieve tax exempt ACOs from the requirement that exempt participants such as hospitals have 
“control” over the ACO.59 While preserving a requirement that 75 percent of ACO‟s governing 
body be chosen by ACO participants (providers and suppliers), the Final Rule allows for 
alternative structures that “involve ACO participants in innovative ways in ACO governance.”
Financial rewards.  The Final Rule revised the formula for distributing savings so that 
ACOs achieving savings will receive a share of the first dollar of savings rather than have to first 
exceed a benchmark. 
Waivers of Fraud and Abuse Laws. Pursuant to statutory authority contained in the ACA, 
HHS set out a number of waivers from the Physician Self-Referral Law, the federal anti-
kickback statute, and the gainsharing Civil Monetary Penalty law.60  These waivers will allow 
providers to share startup costs, distribute shared savings, and provide certain incentives to 
beneficiaries without running afoul of those laws.  
56  Final Rule, supra note xx at 67,891. 
57 Id. at 67,843. See also Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care 
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 
2011) [hereinafter Final Policy Statement]. See discussion infra note xx and accompanying text.  
58  Final Rule, supra note xx at 67,891.  
59  I.R.S. Notice 2011-20, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-20.pdf; I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS 
2011-11, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-2011-11.pdf. 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=248490,00.html. 
60  Waiver Designs in Connection With the Medicare Shared Savings Program and the Innovation Center, 
76 Fed. Reg. 19,655, 19,655-19,660 (Apr. 7, 2011). 
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Shared savings without sharing risk.  Backing away from a proposed requirement that all 
ACOs bear risk by year three, the Final rule allows ACOs to choose a three-year, shared-savings-
only version.61
 These changes illustrate myriad, and sometimes conflicting, policies embedded in the 
ACO experiment.  For example, a central objective of the MSSP is to stimulate investment in 
ACOs. However this entails nuanced regulation that simultaneously encourages ACO formation 
by as-yet unintegrated providers while also rewarding entities already operating as integrated 
delivery systems. In addition, ACOs hold the promise of restraining cost growth in the Medicare 
program but at the same time encouraging investments in evidence-based medicine, “patient-
centered” delivery, electronic health records and other service innovations.  Further, a key 
determinant of the MSSP‟s success will be its coordination and influence in commercial 
insurance and delivery markets.  As will be discussed in the following sections of this article, this 
goal calls for flexibility in regulatory matters and careful attention to avoid legal standards that 
invite cost shifting or other harmful spillovers in those markets.  
II. Regulating Medicare to Improve Private Markets 
 Since its inception, traditional Medicare has reimbursed providers using methodologies 
that reward volume.  Medicare Part B pays physicians on a fee-for-service basis, i.e. issuing a 
separate payment for each service provided to Medicare beneficiaries.62  Hospitals, reimbursed 
under Part A, receive prospective reimbursements for all services provided to beneficiaries under 
specific diagnoses.   Although this methodology is commendable for bundling hospital services 
and thus mitigating volume-enhancing incentives to some extent, it not free of cost-escalating 
incentives.  For example, historically hospitals have been overpaid for readmitted patients and, 
under some circumstances, for patients with multiple diagnoses.63  Moreover, physician and 
hospital incentives are misaligned.  As a result of fee-for-service payment physicians have strong 
incentives to increase the volume of services provided in hospitals, while prospective payment 
rewards hospitals for economizing on care.  With independent physicians calling the shots on 
care in most hospitals, their power to admit, prescribe tests and services, and extend the stays of 
patients in hospitals have caused hospital costs to escalate enormously despite prospective 
payment reforms.  Hospitals have responded by increasing admissions and have benefited by 
generous reimbursement for diagnoses served by new technologies.64  Further, while Congress 
61  Final Rule, supra note xx at 67,929.  
62 See Alice G. Gosfield, Value Purchasing In Medicare Law: Precursor to Health Reform, 20 AM. J.L.
& MED. 169, 174 (1994).   
63  Almost 18% of hospitalizations result in readmissions within thirty days, costing the Medicare 
program $15 billion in 2005. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, PROMOTING GREATER 
EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE (2007), available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun07_EntireReport.pdf.  
64  MedPAC, Annual Report at xx. 
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has repeatedly attempted to control Medicare costs through per service rate controls, expansion 
in the amount of services per patient have more than offset price regulation. 
 As described above, the MSSP seeks to encourage formation of integrated delivery 
systems capable of receiving value based payments.  Although the ACA gave the Secretary of 
HHS discretion to employ capitated payment models for ACOs,65 she chose not do so.  Instead, 
the MSSP continues fee for service payment and provides bonuses to ACOs if their patients‟ 
total health care costs are below a projected amount based on the historic spending of providers 
in that ACO.   The program‟s financial incentives are skewed to minimizing the transitional 
uncertainties in other ways as well.  For example it rewards cost savings regardless of whether 
the benchmark of the particular ACO is relatively high or low and ACOs may seek a “bonus 
only” model and avoid risking financial losses in its initial three year contract.  
Despite the market-improving potential of ACO delivery systems, the private market has 
not led the way.  While a number of commercial insurance companies have initiated programs to 
reward ACO delivery models most of them rely on a shared savings model rather than requiring 
ACOs to share financial risk.66  Historically, Medicare payment policies strongly influence 
private payment with private payors generally adopting the methods and details of government 
payment.  They do so as a result of collective action problems—the difficulties inherent in 
securing providers‟ acceptance of innovative payment methodologies often requiring new 
practice methods for only a fraction of their patient base.  
The architects of health reform were especially attuned to the goal of encouraging 
widespread adoption of the ACOs and therefore strove to design the MSSP to encourage ACOs 
serving Medicare beneficiaries to contract with private payers as well.67 This required CMS to 
strike a delicate balance between serving Medicare‟s programmatic goals while also innovative 
and competitive ACO formation in the private sector.   As discussed below the private and public 
payment sector share common interests in promoting development of efficient delivery systems 
and preventing harms to patients. At the same time the regulatory mission of CMS is centered on 
advancing the goals of the Medicare program and not on supervising the market served by 
private insurance.   
65 ACA §3022.
66  As of the end of 2011, at least eight private insurers have ACO contracts employing a shared risk 
payment model (making providers eligible for both bonuses and penalties) and 27 have shared savings 
programs (paying bonuses only).  None in the private sector have moved to full capitation.  Berenson & 
Burton, supra note xx at 3.  
67  For example, the Affordable Care Act provides that CMS should give preference to ACO applicants 
that have contracts with private insurers. ACA § 1324.  Other inducements aimed at encouraging private 
sector ACOs include relaxation and clarification of antitrust standards. See infra note xx; Final Rule, 
supra note xx at 67,834 (noting advance payment of MSSP bonuses to enable small provider groups to 
absorb startup costs).  
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 In many respects the goals of the Medicare program and private insurance payers are 
congruent.  Encouraging providers to develop more efficient delivery organizations has the 
potential to improve quality and outcomes. Studies show that integrated delivery systems and 
multi-specialty provide more preventive services68 and have on average better quality 
indicators.69  In addition, integrated systems are a pre-requisite for channeling and distributing 
payments to providers so as to permit effective rationalization of care.  Providers accepting 
responsibility for care delivery for a defined population will of necessity need to coordinate 
delivery and agree on protocols for practice, distribution of income and a variety of other issues. 
Numerous other reforms contained in the ACA such as bundled payment pilot programs70 also 
depend on providers adopting integrative delivery models. 
This congruence notwithstanding, given CMS‟s regulatory mission and the fiscal and 
political climate in which it operates today, it is at least questionable whether the MSSP will 
adequately serve the interests of the private market.  Most significant is the fact that Medicare 
relies primarily administrative pricing and command regulation to control costs. That is, CMS is 
unlikely to focus on promoting provider competition—the driving force for cost control in 
private insurance markets—because, to put it bluntly, Medicare can dictate its prices to doctors 
and hospitals.71 Operating in a political environment in which government expenditures are 
under intense scrutiny, the impulse to shift costs to the private sector is likely to be significant.  
Moreover, concerns about the excesses of managed care that surfaced in the 1990s have not 
disappeared,72 and government regulators may be overly zealous in promulgating regulations 
designed to protect consumers.  For example, it appears that CMS overlearned the lessons of the 
managed care backlash in fashioning excessively restrictive regulations for ACOs in its Proposed 
68  Shortell et al., supra note xx at 96. 
69  The Demonstration project that preceded the ACA provides some evidence that integrated delivery 
under ACO-type incentives will improve quality of care. The 10 physician organizations in that 
demonstration program met performance benchmarks for the vast majority of the applicable quality 
measures (32 measures covering diabetes, coronary artery disease, congestive heart failure, hypertension, 
and cancer screening).  Berenson and Burton, supra note xx at 7. 
70  ACA § 3023. See generally Peter S. Hussey et al., The PROMETHEUS Bundled Payment Experiment: 
Slow Start Shows Problems in Implementing New Payment Models, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2116, 2117 (2011).  
71  Professors Havighurst and Richman express doubt that CMS would be attentive to private market 
competition: 
One might wonder, of course, whether a governmental single payer like Medicare would ever 
have the mission, the impulse, or the requisite creativity to be helpful in making private markets 
for health services effectively competitive. The more likely scenario, unfortunately, is that 
Medicare will be happy to see costs shifted to the private sector--and may even reward ACOs' 
cost shifting as cost savings. 
Clark C. Havighurst & Barak Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care, 89 OR. L. REV.
847, 874 (2011).  
72 See Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating to Promote Competition in Designing Health Insurance 
Exchanges, 20 U. Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol‟y 237 (2011)(noting the somewhat misplaced emphasis in the 
debate over health reform on the excesses of managed care). 
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Rule,73 although it subsequently responded to strenuous criticisms by reducing the quality 
measures for which organizations will be accountable in its Final Rule.74
 A central problem confronting governmental efforts to regulate ACOs with an eye to 
protecting competition in private markets is the issue of cost shifting. Some question whether 
Medicare payment policies have in the past caused providers to shift costs to private payers. 
Economic theory challenges the simplest cost-shifting formulation-- that providers raise their 
prices to private payers to recoup whatever they may lose because Medicare pays less—because 
monopoly providers are likely to be charging private payers a profit-maximizing price already.  
However, cost shifting is entirely possible where providers have unused bargaining leverage.  
Given that over seventy percent of acute care hospitals are nonprofit, thus arguably operating 
under somewhat different incentives than for-profit entities, and that political and social factors 
may affect hospital board‟s willingness to maximize profits, the existence of unused bargaining 
power is plausible.   
While a number of empirical studies suggest that cost shifting does sometimes occur,75 a 
more nuanced account has emerged from an examination of the relationship between market 
competition and hospital costs. This analysis relies on the well-documented tendency of hospitals 
in concentrated local markets to exercise their bargaining leverage to raise prices they charge to 
private insurers. Although they may extract these profits regardless of whether Medicare 
payments are adequate or inadequate to cover the treatment costs for Medicare beneficiaries, 
empirical analysis indicates that hospitals use these revenues to engage in the so-called “medical 
arms race” (expansions in capacity, acquisition of new clinical technologies, enhancement of 
staff budgets). 76As the 2009 MedPAC annual report explains, this hydraulic explains the fact 
that dominant hospitals have higher costs per patient, and therefore lower Medicare margins 
73  See Scott Gottlieb, Accountable Care Organizations: The end of Innovation in Medicine?, 3 AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL. RES. 1, 1 (2011) (citing criticisms of the proposed rule).   
74  Responding to many comments that the measurement targets were overly burdensome, CMS reduced 
the quality measures from 65 to 33 and reduced the number of “domains” governing quality indicators. 
To satisfy quality performance requirements for a domain, ACO must report all measures within a domain 
and score above the minimum attainment level determined by CMS on 70% of the measures in a domain. 
Moreover, CMS backed off a requirement that ACOs must meet the quality performance thresholds for all 
of the proposed measures to be eligible for shared savings, requiring instead that ACOs achieve the 
minimum attainment level for at least one measure in each of the four domains to be eligible to receive 
shared savings. See Final Rule, supra note xx at 67,891. 
75  Rexford E. Santerre, The Welfare loss from Hospital Cost-Shifting Behavior: A Partial Equilibrium 
Analysis, 14 HEALTH ECON. 621, 624 (2005) (concluding that “a 1 percent relative decrease in the 
average Medicare price is associated with a 0.17 percent increase in the corresponding price paid by 
privately insured patients.”); Vivian Wu, Hospital Cost-Shifting Revisited: New Evidence From The 
Balanced Budget Act Of 1997, 10 INT J. HEALTH CARE FINANCE ECON. 61, 76 (2010); Jack Zwanziger & 
Anil Bamezai, Evidence Of Cost-Shifting In California Hospitals, 25 HEALTH AFF. 197(2006); M.A. 
Morrisey, Hospital Cost Shifting, A Continuing Debate, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 180 (Employee Benefit 
Research Institute), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/1296ib.pdf.
76 See James Robinson, Hospitals Respond To Medicare Shortfalls By Both Shifting Costs And Cutting 
Them, Based On Market Concentration, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1265, 1267 (2011); Jeffrey Stensland et al., 
Private-Payer Profits Can Induce Negative Medicare Margins, 22 HEALTH AFF. 1045, 1049 (2010). 
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because Medicare pays fixed prices that are insensitive to market power of hospitals.77
(Conversely, hospitals in competitive markets realize higher Medicare margins owing to lower 
cost structures caused by rivalry in their markets). 
The effects of concentration and the cost shifting hydraulic are felt by the Medicare 
program as well as by the private market.  As a general matter, market dominance protected by 
significant barriers to entry tends to result in less innovation.  In health care markets this suggests 
that the spur to undertake cost savings through the arduous process of changing long standing 
medical practices will be attenuated. Second, there is some evidence that market concentration 
produces lower quality, as measured by indices of mortality and outcomes.78  Such effects 
obviously redound to harm Medicare beneficiaries and private pay patients alike.  Third, 
disparities in profit margins, if sufficient may reduce participation by providers, thereby 
undermining access for beneficiaries.  Likewise, low margins for services specific to the 
Medicare population will result in less investment by providers in those services.   
This section has demonstrated the close interconnection between private and public 
markets.  Two salient policy prescriptions follow from this analysis.  In regulating ACOs CMS 
should abandon its historic agnosticism with regard to cost shifting.  Beyond carefully evaluating 
data gathered under the MSSP, it should insist that, as a condition of renewal after the expiration 
of their three year contracts, ACOs document pricing patterns in the private sector to determine 
whether significant cost-shifting has occurred and whether purported cost savings in the program 
were realized.  The second implication for policy analysis, discussed in the next section, is that 
significant interagency cooperation between CMS and the antitrust agencies is needed to curb the 
anticompetitive effects that providers with dominant market power may wreak on both private 
markets and the Medicare program.  
III. Antitrust, Competition Policy and ACOs 
Concerns about the competiveness of provider markets have shadowed the MSSP 
implementation process. Policy experts, trade associations and academics have questioned 
whether local hospital and physician markets will be conducive to achieving the program‟s 
goals.79  Three distinct issues must be considered.  First, one must question whether ACOs can 
accomplish the MSSP‟s ambitious “triple aim” in the absence of vigorously competitive provider 
markets that will permit intra-network rivalry to flourish.  Second, concerns have been raised as 
to whether the MSSP itself will stimulate additional concentration of provider markets and 
whether antitrust enforcement will be able to curb anticompetitive mergers and joint ventures. 
Finally, regulators will need to strike a balance between supervising quality and competitive 
conditions on the one hand, and encouraging entry by multiple networks in each market on the 
other.   
Provider Concentration and Bargaining Leverage 
77  MedPAC Report, supra note xx. 
78 See infra note xx and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes xx-xx and accompanying text. 
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   Provider market power poses the biggest obstacle to the success of the ACO strategy.  As 
a general matter, it is clear that over the last fifteen years providers have generally gained the 
upper hand in bargaining with payers. 80 A large body of literature documents the existence, 
scope, and effects of market concentration.  Meta-analysis by Vogt and Town demonstrates a 
strong correlation between hospital market concentration and escalating costs of health 
insurance: hospital consolidation in the 1990s raised overall inpatient prices by at least 5%, and 
by 40% or more when merging hospitals were located close to one another.81 An important study 
undertaken by the Massachusetts Attorney General documents the effects of provider leverage on 
health care costs and insurance premiums,82 notably finding prices for health services are 
uncorrelated with quality, complexity, proportion of government patients, or academic status but 
instead are positively correlated with provider market power.83  Another report, drawing on site 
visits by the Center for Studying Health System Change to six California markets in 2008, found 
that provider leverage has had a “major impact on California premium trends.”84   Interviews in 
these markets revealed that the bargaining power of hospitals has been enhanced by extensive 
horizontal consolidation.  In many markets around the country, hospitals have been able to 
establish themselves as “must have” hospitals --meaning health plans must include them in their 
networks to offer insurance products attractive to employers and consumers—by means of 
advertising, locational advantages, or other means that establish a “reputation for perceived 
quality—not to be confused with measured clinical quality.” Finally, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that large multispecialty group practices and independent practice associations also 
exercise market power by virtue of a lack of price competition for their services.85
 Other, subtler results have also flowed from the wave of consolidations and the 
marginalization of managed care. An important effect of increasing consolidation in hospital 
markets, generally ignored by antitrust analysis, is the effect of “cross-market” mergers, i.e. 
those occurring between hospitals in distinct geographic markets. Recent economic analysis has 
demonstrated that anticompetitive effects can occur where large hospital systems enhance their 
bargaining leverage vis a vis payers by threatening to create gaps or “holes” in payers‟ coverage 
in a geographic region.86  Second, besides price increases owing to enhanced bargaining power, 
growth in hospital costs appear to have been driven by strategic decisions that take advantage of 
market imperfections and the absence of effective monitoring by payers.  By some accounts, the 
80 See Ginsburg Testimony, supra note xx, at 1-2 (summarizing site visits conducted by Center for Study 
of Health Systems Change and empirical studies of effects of increased provider concentration and 
finding a shift in the “balance of negotiating power…in favor of providers, particularly hospitals.”).  
81  Robert Vogt & Robert Town, How Has Hospital Consolidation Affected the Price and Quality of 
Hospital Care?, in THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT 2006 (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Research Synthesis 
Report No. 9), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/no9researchreport.pdf.  
82  MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL, EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST 
DRIVERS PURSUANT TO G.L. C. 118G, § 6½(B) (2010), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/final-report-w-cover-appendices-glossary.pdf [hereinafter 
Health Care Cost Trends]. 
83 Id. at 16-33. 
84  Robert Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows Challenges to Health 
Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 704 (2010). See also Ginsburg Testimony, supra note xx. 
85 See e.g., Ginsburg,  supra note 84. 
86  Greg S. Vistnes, Cross-Market Hospital Mergers: A Holistic Approach available at SSRN. See also, 
Berenson, supra note 84 at 702 (noting that all-or-nothing bargaining increases leverage of regional 
hospital systems in California).  
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“medical arms race” has resurfaced. 87 That is, hospitals have undertaken significant expansions 
in high-margin services and have accelerated technology acquisitions, a phenomenon attributable 
in part to providers‟ capacity to induce demand.  In addition, specialty physicians have proved 
unwilling to join multi-specialty practices, preferring to consolidate into single specialty 
practices.88  The latter organizational form, which allows specialty physicians to reap the 
financial benefits of their bargaining leverage, also denies patients the clinical and cost-saving 
advantages associated with integrated practice arrangements.   
  The foregoing analysis, exposing the problem of extant provider market power, spells 
trouble for the ACO strategy.   Hospitals and dominant physician specialty groups have been 
able to command substantial increases in reimbursement from private health insurers and 
effectively insulate themselves from pressures to accept change in payment or practice 
arrangements.  Providers enjoying market power or “must have” status will be reluctant to cede 
control or equitably share revenues with other providers or substantially alter the way they 
practice medicine. While dominant providers may feel compelled to form ACOs out of concern 
that CMS may ultimately condition Medicare payments to strongly favor such organizations, 
they are likely to seek arrangements that entrench and perhaps expand their market power vis a 
vis private insurers.  A closely related concern is that monolithic ACOs dominant in multiple 
provider services will thwart the objective of ensuring multiple ACOs or other rivalrous 
networks in each market so as to promote continuing incentives to improve quality and lower 
costs over time.89   These concerns led HHS to enlist the support of the federal antitrust 
enforcement agencies to monitor the effects of additional provider consolidation stimulated by 
the MSSP. 
The FTC/ Department of Justice Statement of Enforcement Policy 
 In conjunction with the issuance by CMS of the final MSSP regulations, the Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission issued a final joint "Statement of Antitrust Enforcement 
Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program."90 The FTC/DOJ Statement, which made some significant changes from an earlier 
Proposed Statement, outlines the general enforcement policies the agencies will apply in 
analyzing the effect of CMS-approved ACOs on private insurance markets. Importantly, the 
antitrust agencies recognized the need to steer a delicate course between encouraging market 
entry and deterring agreements that impeded competition. Accordingly, the Final Statement 
attempts to strike a balance between (1) clarifying antitrust standards and review procedures 
applicable to participants in the private insurance market so as not to deter procompetitive 
cooperation and consolidation among providers and (2) exercising effective oversight of 
consolidations spurred by the MSSP that may damage competition in private markets.  
The Final Statement is noteworthy for several policies designed to encourage ACO 
development and remove some uncertainties surrounding the application of antitrust law. First, it 
87 See Robert A. Berenson et al., Hospital-Physician Relations: Cooperation, Competition, or 
Separation?, 26 HEALTH AFF. w31 (2007), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/1/w31.full.pdf. 
88  Lawton Burns & Mark V. Pauly, Integrated Delivery Networks: A Detour on the Road to Integrated 
Health?, 21 HEALTH AFF. 128 (2002). 
89  Final Rule, supra note xx at 67,841 (noting that CMS has stated that its objective is to have at least two 
ACOs in every market).  
90  Final Statement, supra note xx.  
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announces that CMS's eligibility criteria -- including a management structure that comprises 
clinical and administrative processes and processes to promote evidence-based medicine and 
patient engagement -- are broadly consistent with the agencies' prior statements regarding 
clinical integration.91 Through an extensive series of advisory opinions,92 policy statements93 and 
speeches,94 the FTC has articulated detailed criteria to identify physician networks that have 
undertaken sufficient coordination of clinical and organizational arrangements so as to make the 
physicians‟ efforts truly interdependent and hence not subject to summary condemnation as price 
fixing arrangements. The Final Statement also indicated that joint negotiations with private 
payers will be deemed reasonably necessary to an ACO's purpose of improving health care, and 
ACOs utilizing the same structure and processes used in the shared savings program to serve 
privately insured patients will accordingly be afforded rule of reason treatment. 95 Together these 
statements effectively remove the possibility that an ACO certified by CMS will be regarded as 
price fixing and subject to strict, per se scrutiny. Finally the agencies also set parameters for 
market power and incorporate a new metric for assessing market power in ACO networks. The 
Final statement announces a "safety zone" for ACOs whose independent participants provide a 
"common service" and have a combined share of 30 percent or less of each such common service 
in each participant's primary service area.96 ACOs falling within the safety zone will be 
presumed to be “highly unlikely to raise significant competitive concerns.”97
These pronouncements constitute a modest relaxation of antitrust standards previously 
announced by the agencies.  The standard for clinical integration applied by the FTC advisory 
opinions involves an examination of various indicia testing the degree of interdependence and 
cooperation among physician participants.98 As a general matter, the agency has sought to avoid 
91  Final Statement, supra note xx at 67,027. 
92 See e.g., Letter from Markus H. Meier, Assistant Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade 
Commission, to Christi J. Braun, Attorney, Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver (Apr. 13, 2009), available at
www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/090413tristateaoletter.pdf. 
93  U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM‟N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0000.pdf. 
94  See e.g., Thomas B. Leary, Remarks at the Saint Louis University Health Law Symposium (Apr. 12, 
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/eicreview.pdf. 
95  Final Policy Statement, supra note xx at 67,027. 
96 Id. at 67,028. 
97 Id.
98  Summarizing the detailed analysis contained in four FTC advisory opinions assessing meaningful 
“clinical integration”, Burke and Rosenbaum identify the following criteria:  
“systems to establish goals relating to quality and appropriate utilization of
services;” regular evaluation of “both individual participants‟ and a network‟s aggregate 
performance with respect to those goals;” control over practice, as evidenced by the ability to 
“modify individual participants‟ actual practices where necessary based on those evaluations;” 
development of practice  standards and protocols “to govern treatment and utilization of 
services;” use of information systems to gather aggregate and individual data on cost and quality; 
a dimension of financial risk in the sense of a “significant investment of capital to purchase such 
systems;” the investment of human resources in collective quality improvement; the upward 
reporting within the provider arrangement  of “detailed reports on the cost and quality of services 
provided, and on the network‟s success in meeting its goals;” and a medical director and staff 
capable of conducting clinical quality improvement and performance reporting activities as well 
as rate negotiations. 
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being overly prescriptive in its approach to clinical integration. Instead, its letters provided 
lengthy analyses of the features of each proposal, pointing to factors that tended to create a “high 
degree of interdependence and cooperation among physicians to control cost and ensure 
quality.”99 The letters also address a second question critical to ancillary restraint analysis: Is 
collective price negotiation reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals of the clinically 
integrated network?  In the letters providing a favorable response, the FTC has relied upon 
evidence that an agreement on price promoted physician cooperation with standards and ensured 
network stability.100 It should be noted however that although the FTC has been broadly 
supportive of efforts to form networks relying on clinical integration, some within the agency 
hold the view that financial integration offers a more reliable incentive to produce efficiencies 
necessary to justify enhanced opportunities to exercise market power.101
In a notable concession aimed at reducing uncertainty and encouraging ACO development, 
the antitrust agencies have elected to defer to CMS on the issue of clinical integration. The Final 
Statement provides that “organizations meeting the CMS criteria for approval as an ACO are 
reasonably likely to be bona fide arrangements intended to improve the quality, and reduce the 
costs, of providing medical and other health care services through their participants' joint 
efforts.”102 The standards that will be applied by CMS to determine eligibility to participate in 
the MSSP are less specific, but broadly congruent with the standards identified by the FTC 
advisory opinions.103  Although some commenters have criticized the agencies for ceding their 
responsibility for monitoring competition in private markets to CMS,104 in this instance, 
deference appears entirely appropriate.  The Final Statement‟s approach to clinical integration is 
an acknowledgement of the uncertainty inherent in a multi-factor, case-by-case evaluation of the 
Taylor Burke & Sara Rosenbaum, Accountable Care Organizations: Implications for Antitrust Policy, 19 
Health L. Rep. (BNA)  (2010). 
99  Letter from Markus H. Meier, supra note 92 at 4 (quoting Health Policy Statements). 
100 Id. See also Letter from Jeffrey W. Brennan, Assistant Director, Health Care Services & Products, 
Federal Trade Commission, to John J. Miles, Attorney, Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver (Feb. 19, 2002), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/adops/medsouth.shtm. But cf. Letter from Markus H. Meier, Assistant 
Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, to Christi J. Braun and John J. Miles, 
Attorneys, Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver (Sept. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/adops/gripa.pdf (stating mere claims of enhanced efficiencies insufficient to justify 
collective price setting); Letter from David R. Pender, Acting Assistant Director, Bureau of Competition, 
Federal Trade Commission, to Clifton E. Johnson and William H. Thompson, Attorneys, Hall, Render, 
Killian, Heath & Lyman (Mar. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/SuburbanHealthOrganizationStaffAdvisoryOpinion03282006.pdf. 
101  J. Thomas Rosch, Remarks before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum (Nov. 17, 2011), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/111117fallforumspeech.pdf (sharply questioning the 
Commission‟s solicitude toward clinical integration arrangements).
102  Final Policy Statement, supra note xx at 67,028. 
103  Burke & Rosenbaum, supra note 98 at 14 (finding a “high degree of concordance” between the FTC 
and CMS standards but acknowledge that “the degree of concordance would be even more so in ACO 
models that employ both clinical integration and financing arrangements that rely on population-based 
capitation and use of a salary-plus-performance-bonus payment system.”).
104  Douglas Rosenthal et al., Affordable Care Act Signals New Direction for Antitrust Enforcement in 
Healthcare, 100 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 738 (2011) (noting antitrust agencies‟ position 
marks “a significant shift away from [their] traditional role in the health care sector and a partial 
surrendering of antitrust oversight”). 
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clinical integration and a pragmatic effort to cooperate with CMS to encourage entry into the 
ACO market.  At the same time, the agencies‟ deference to CMS regulatory standards marks a 
striking departure from their customary practice of evaluating competitive issues based on the 
specific conditions obtaining in individual circumstances and a general aversion to 
administrative regulation of markets.   
Other aspects of the Final Statement are more controversial. For ACOs that meet CMS 
eligibility criteria, the antitrust agencies have established several important changes in their 
procedures and standards for review of possible antitrust problems.  Notably these provisions are 
designed to give some reassurance to entities forming ACOs that their formation and operation 
will not be subject to federal antitrust challenge based on the ACOs‟ effects in the private 
market. Approval, however, will not be a precondition for participation in the MSSP.  As we will 
see, this change constitutes an important misstep that may severely undermine effective policing 
of dominant providers.  
To further advance the goals of reducing uncertainty and encouraging ACO formation, the 
Final Statement establishes a “safety zone” for ACOs that combine independent providers by 
means other than merger.  ACOs meeting the antitrust agencies‟ standards are “highly unlikely to 
raise significant competitive concerns.” To qualify, ACOs must satisfy the following two 
requirements to fall within the Safety Zone: (1) “independent ACO participants … that provide 
the same services … must have a combined share of 30 percent or less of each common service 
in each participant's PSA, wherever two or more ACO participants provide that service to 
patients from that PSA”; and (2) “Any hospital or ambulatory surgery center … participating in 
an ACO must be non-exclusive to the ACO … regardless of its PSA share.” 105 The PSA referred 
to above is a measure—and one not recognized in antitrust precedents—that will serve as a 
proxy for calculating combined market share of independent ACO participants. The antitrust 
agencies here opted for pragmatism over economic accuracy: the PSA standard as a   to enable 
ACOs to calculate market power for safety zone eligibility using a convenient, administrable 
standard.106  The quantitative aspects of the standard are roughly equivalent to standards 
contained in the antitrust agencies‟ Health Policy Statements though in some respects it is more 
lenient.107 Moreover, ACOs comprised of dominant providers are subject to some restrictions,108
but are not precluded from qualifying for safety zone treatment.  Significantly, enforcement for 
hospital dominated ACO would not be materially different than the environment facing 
105  Final Policy Statement, supra note 90 at 67,029. 
106  As defined in the Final Policy Statement, a PSA is the lowest number of postal zip codes from which 
the provider obtains at least 75 percent of its patients. Physician services are based on Medicare Specialty 
Codes as defined by CMS, and shares are calculated based on total Medicare allowed charges for claims 
billed. Inpatient services are based on Medical Diagnostic Categories and calculated based on patient 
discharge data; for outpatient services provided by hospitals or ambulatory surgery centers, shares are 
based on Medicare fee-for-service payment data for the common services categories. Final Policy 
Statement, supra note 90 at 67,031. 
107  The 1996 FTC/DOJ Policy Statements on Healthcare provide set the safety zone for physician 
networks at 20 percent for exclusive networks, and 30 percent for non-exclusive networks. Dep‟t of 
Justice & FTC, Health Care Policy Statements, Statement 8, supra note xx.  ACOs may qualify for the 
safety zone with dominant providers with market shares --- is this sentence complete? 
108  ACOs may contain a participant with greater than 50% share of a service in  its PSA if it is non-
exclusive and no other ACO participant provides the same service in that PSA.   
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physician-only ACOs; arguably this lowers the standard applied under the agencies Policy 
Statements which subjected multi-provider networks to more rigorous scrutiny than physician-
only networks.109
An overall appraisal of the Final Statement reveals, at most, a modest relaxation of antitrust 
standards for ACOs.  Some aspects of prior safety zones are lessened: ACOs lacking financial 
integration may qualify as presumptively legal under the safety zone whereas a full rule of 
reason analysis was required under the Policy Statement. Further, ACO with exclusive networks 
combining providers up to 30 market share (rather than 20 percent), ACOs with a single provider 
with more than 50 percent of the services in one area, and multi-provider networks that include 
hospitals all may enjoy safety zone treatment.110  However these changes are not major 
departures from the earlier guidelines promulgated by the agencies, and may, in fact, be more
stringent than the enforcement policies actually practiced by the FTC and Department of 
Justice.111 Of greater concern, as discussed in the next section of this article, are the measures not 
undertaken to expand and improve antitrust oversight of provider consolidation resulting from 
the formation of ACOs. 
Antitrust Law’s Achilles Heel: Dealing with Extant Market Power
A common misapprehension among legislators and policymakers is that antitrust law 
provides a reliable counterforce to monopoly.  With respect to extant monopolies, legally 
acquired, the opposite is true:  antitrust law tolerates the exercise of market power (which 
includes charging higher prices, reducing output, and/or lowering quality) and generally 
intervenes only where monopolists wrongfully exercise that power to exclude or harm rivals.112
Dominant hospital systems and provider groups face little danger that they will be broken into 
smaller units. Moreover they are free to insist on monopoly levels of reimbursement and the 
extensive literature on hospital-payor bargaining confirms that dominant providers commonly 
exercise their positional leverage vis a vis private payers.113
Nothing in the CMS Final Rule, the antitrust agencies‟ Final Statement, or federal antitrust 
enforcement policies suggests that the regulation of ACOs will lessen extant provider 
concentration.  For example, despite the recent wave of physician acquisitions by hospitals and 
mergers of competing providers, the agencies did not take steps to incorporate retrospective 
reviews of mergers into their evaluation of ACO applicants under the MSSP.114  Indeed, ACOs 
with dominant providers will qualify for safety zone treatment if they are nonexclusive.115
109  Kasper, supra note xx at 231. 
110  Final Policy Statement, supra note xx at 67,029. See Kasper, supra note xx at 231-2(comparing safety 
zone treatment and other provisions of the 1996 Policy Statements and the Final Policy Statement). 
111 See Thomas L. Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude: Antitrust Law and Physician Cartels, 7 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL‟Y 189 (2007) (describing lax antitrust enforcement for physician networks). 
112 See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (stressing need to confine reach of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act in order to preserve incentives to innovate, avoid risks of false positives, 
and preserve monopolists‟ “right” to choose trading partners). 
113 See supra, notes xx & xx and accompanying text. 
114 See infra, notes xx and xx and accompanying text. 
115 See supra, note xx and accompanying text. 
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Hence it is clear that many ACOs will be comprised of providers with market power.  To the 
extent that ACOs combine providers with some degree of market power, the MSSP may actually 
enhance the bargaining power  of those providers and also enable the ACO to leverage that 
power to benefit other provider segments that did not have bargaining power prior to joining the 
ACO. 
Despite its incapacity to de-concentrate markets, antitrust law does impose some restrictions 
on the exercise of market power by dominant firms.  Firms that use their dominant position to 
exclude rivals, raise their costs, or otherwise hinder the competitive process may be subject to 
treble damages or injunctions under the Sherman Act.   Several recent cases illustrate the ability 
of dominant providers to insist on exclusionary contracts (sometimes with dominant insurers) 
that impair the ability of rival hospitals to compete.  For example in United States v. United 
Regional Health Care System,116 a case recently settled by a consent decree, the Department of 
Justice alleged that the defendant, a dominant, “must-have” hospital117 entered into contracts 
with commercial health insurance companies, requiring the insurance companies had to pay a 
“substantial pricing penalty,” ranging from 13% to 27%, if the insurers also contracted with 
competing providers.  Though rationalized by defendants as “discount” pricing, the government 
claimed they were of such magnitude as to make it commercially unreasonable for an insurance 
company to enter into a contract with competing hospitals, unless the competing hospital would 
agree to prices below United Regional's marginal cost. The government claimed that by 
foreclosing rivals from the most profitable health insurance contracts, defendant was able to 
entrench its market dominance.118
In another case involving allegations of exclusionary contracting by a dominant hospital, 
West Penn Allegheny Health System,119 the second-largest hospital system in Pittsburgh, alleged 
that the dominant hospital system in the market, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 
conspired with Highmark Inc., the market‟s dominant insurer in a scheme designed to protect 
both defendants from competition in their respective markets.   West Penn Allegheny claimed 
that UPMC had agreed to refuse to enter into competitive provider contracts with Highmark‟s 
rivals and take other steps advantageous to Highmark in return for Highmark‟s agreement to pay 
to UPMC “supracompetitive reimbursement rates” made possible by increasing its insurance 
premiums.120 The Third Circuit found the alleged conduct, amounting to a conspiracy between UPMC 
116  United States v. United Regional Health Care System, No. 7:11-cv-00030-O (N.D. Tex. Filed Feb. 11, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f276000/276027.pdf. 
117 The government‟s complaint alleged that United controlled approximately 90% of the market for 
inpatient services sold to commercial insurers market and 65% of the market for outpatient surgical 
services sold to commercial insurers. United States v. United Regional Health Care System, No. 7:11-cv-
00030-O, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f276000/276027.pdf. 
118 Id. at yy. 
119  West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
120 Id. at 93.  
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and Highmark to drive out West Penn out of the market, sufficiently anticompetitive to survive a motion 
to dismiss.121
Finally, Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth122 illustrates the exercise of pricing power 
by a dominant hospital.  This case arose in a two hospital market: Cascade offered primary and 
secondary care services while PeaceHealth offered primary, secondary, and tertiary care services. 
The alleged anticompetitive conduct focused on PeaceHealth pricing strategy involved discounts 
on tertiary services to insurance companies that made PeaceHealth their exclusive provider for 
primary, secondary, and tertiary services. In addition, PeaceHealth also offered less favorable 
prices generally to insurance companies that contracted with Cascade as a preferred provider for 
primary or secondary care services. Plaintiff alleged defendant‟s “bundled” pricing operated to 
exclude it from the market in violation of the Sherman Act. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit adopted 
a test that struck a middle ground between competing standards found in precedents, scholarship 
and a commission chartered to study antitrust doctrine.123 However much remains unresolved as 
to the appropriate measure of improper bundled pricing or the test to determine the likelihood of 
harm to consumers.124
These and other cases125 involving the interplay hospital and payor dominance yield several 
important lessons. Hospitals with market power may seek to entrench or extend their dominant 
position by a variety of contracting or pricing schemes. In some instances, dominant payers and 
dominant hospitals have reached understandings pursuant to which each will refrain from hard 
121 Id. at yy. That, however, was not the end of the saga.  A month after UPMC‟s petition for certiorari 
was dismissed Highmark and West Penn announced merger plans (with Highmark stating it would invest 
$475 million in West Penn).  Not surprisingly, West Penn dismissed its complaint against Highmark. 
122  Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, (9th Cir. 2007). 
123  Concluding that only discounts resulting in prices that are below an appropriate measure of the 
defendant's costs would be subject to antitrust challenge; the court adopted a discount attribution test 
recommended by the Antitrust Modernization Commission.  Id. at 916. At the same time it rejected the 
argument that plaintiff must prove the likelihood that defendants could recoup lost profits from their 
pricing practices. See generally Jeffrey A. Jaekel, Lepage's, Cascade Health Solutions, And A Bundle Of 
Confusion: What Is A Discounter To Do?, 24 ANTITRUST 46 (2010). 
124 Compare Mark S. Popofsky, Section 2, Safe Harbors, and the Rule of Reason, 15 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1265, 1290-94 (2008) (criticizing PeaceHealth for rejecting recoupment requirement) with Einer 
Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and The Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 397, 461-75 (2009). 
125 See e.g., United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, No. 10-cv-14155-DPH-MKM (E.D. 
Mich. filed Oct. 18, 2010) (denying motion for summary judgment in case alleging dominant health 
insurer used anticompetitive “most favored nation” (“MFN”) clauses in its contracts with hospital 
providers to foreclose competition in health insurance market while also increasing hospitals‟ 
reimbursement); Texas v. Memorial Hermann Healthcare Sys., No. 2009-04609 (Tex. Dist. Ct. filed Jan. 
26, 2009) (settling antitrust claims that largest hospital system in Houston discouraged commercial 
insurers from contracting with rival hospitals by threats of termination or demands for large increases in 
reimbursement); Heartland Surgical Specialty Hospital v. Midwest Division, Inc., 527 F.Supp.2d 1257, 
(D. Kan. 2007) (denying summary judgment in case involving alleged conspiracy between combination 
of hospitals accounting for 74% of local market  and insurers accounting for 90% of managed care 
contracts to prevent new specialty hospital from obtaining managed care contracts). 
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bargaining with the other126 or will deal on unfavorable terms with the other‟s rivals.127 While 
antitrust litigation can challenge these tactics, such cases are fact-intensive, require extensive 
analysis, and in areas in which the law remains unsettled.  For example, plaintiffs alleging 
anticompetitive bundling or tying face notoriously high evidentiary burdens and there is 
considerable dispute over the legal standard that is applicable.128 As a result, antitrust law is 
more paper tiger than bulwark against abuse when dealing with incumbent monopolies. The 
following section analyzes other avenues of redress against conduct by dominant providers in the 
context of regulating ACOs. 
Addressing Anticompetitive Conduct in ACOs: The Four “No-Nos,” Mandatory Agency Review,  
and its Demise 
In drafting their Policy Statements and coordinating with CMS, the antitrust agencies were 
acutely aware of risk that extant market power would undermine the procompetitive benefits of 
the ACO strategy. However, a significant change from the framework set forth in CMS‟s 
Proposed Rule and the antitrust agencies‟ Proposed Statement severely undermined prospects for 
achieving some measure of control over potential anticompetitive conduct.  Both the Proposed 
Statement and the Final Statement identify specific categories of conduct, which the Statements 
counsel may, under certain circumstances, raise competitive concerns and should be avoided. 
The most obvious warning is directed at garden-variety horizontal collusion. The Final Statement 
counsels that ACO participants should avoid improper exchanges of price or other competitively 
sensitive information among competing participants, which may facilitate collusion in the 
provision of services outside the ACO.129 The remaining four categories entail vertical 
arrangements that have the potential to foreclose competition by rival networks or raise entry 
barriers. These warnings,130 directed to ACOs with high PSA shares (or other indicia of market 
126 A Handshake That Made Healthcare History, BOS. GLOBE, (Dec. 28, 2008), 
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/healthcare_spotlight (reporting agreement between dominant 
insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, and dominant hospital system Partners Health Care 
pursuant to which Blue Cross would give Partners higher levels of reimbursement, in exchange for 
Partners‟ promise that they would demand the same rate increases from everyone else.   
127 See e.g., U.S. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, discussed supra note xx; West Penn Allegheny 
Health System, Inc. v. UPMC, discussed supra note xx; United States v. United Regional Health Care 
System, No. 7:11-cv-00030-O (N.D. Tex. filed Feb. 25, 2011), discussed supra note xx. 
128 See Jaekel, supra note xx.  
129  Final Policy Statement, supra note xx at 67,029.  The Final Statement distinguishes this warning from 
the others by removing it from the list of five kinds of conduct where it had been placed in the Proposed 
Statement. See Proposed Statement, supra note xx at 21,898. 
130 Although appearing under the heading “Conduct to Avoid,” the four items are later described in the 
Statement as “conduct that may raise anticompetitive concerns.”  Final Policy Statement, supra note xx at 
67,030. It also acknowledges that each category of conduct “may be competitively neutral or even 
procompetitive, depending on the circumstances, including whether the ACO has market power.” Id. The 
Statement goes on to tie the degree of risk to the amount of market power possessed by ACO participants.  
It illustrates this standard with the example of an ACO that requires its participants to contract exclusively 
through the ACO, stating that exclusivity designed to increase an ACO‟s efficiency “is generally less 
likely to raise competitive concerns the greater the number of competing ACOs or independent providers 
available to contract with private payers or to participate in competing ACOs or other analogous 
collaborations.” Id. 
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power), are designed to deter the exercise of market power that “may prevent private payers from 
obtaining lower prices and better quality services for their enrollees.”131
1. Discouraging private payers from directing or incentivizing patients to choose certain 
providers thorough contractual terms such as “anti-steering,” “anti-tiering,” “guaranteed 
inclusion,” and “most favored nations” provisions. 
2. Tying sales of the ACO's services to the private payer's purchase of other services from 
providers outside the ACO, and vice versa. 
3. Contracting with ACO participants on an exclusive basis. 
4. Restricting a private payer's ability to make available cost, quality, efficiency and 
performance information to aid enrollees in evaluating and selecting providers in the 
health plan if it is similar to that used in the shared savings program. 
A very significant aspect of the antitrust agencies‟ Proposed Statement was the screening 
process that CMS and the agencies decided not to pursue.  Backing away from the approach set 
forth in their Proposed Statement, the agencies and CMS eliminated a requirement for mandatory
antitrust review as prerequisite to certification for participation in the MSSP. Mandatory review 
had initially been contemplated for all ACOs whose share for any common service that two or 
more independent ACO participants provided to patients in the same primary service area 
exceeded 50 percent. 132 Thus it subjected those ACOs comprised of dominant providers to close 
antitrust scrutiny both as to their structural characteristics and conduct in the commercial market.   
The preapproval requirement held the promise of accomplishing two objectives. First, it could 
serve to discourage formation of ACOs aiming to press the structural boundaries set forth in the 
Statements.  Further, as discussed below, the mandatory review process gave the antitrust 
agencies additional bargaining leverage in dealing with anticompetitive conduct of the kind 
described in the agencies‟ four antitrust warnings.
  CMS also justified mandatory review as serving the interests of the MSSP program for 
Medicare beneficiaries, arguing it provided assurance that participating ACOs would not be later 
found to present competitive problems that could subject them to antitrust challenge that could 
prevent them from completing the term of their agreement.133  In addition, the agency legitimated 
mandatory review by drawing an explicit link between vigorous private market competition and 
the interests of the Medicare Program: 
[Mandatory antitrust review] would maintain competition for the benefit of 
Medicare beneficiaries by reducing the potential for the creation of ACOs with 
market power. In this context market power refers to the ability of an ACO to 
reduce the quality of care furnished to Medicare beneficiaries and/or to raise 
prices or reduce the quality for commercial health plans and enrollees, thereby 
potentially increasing providers‟ incentives to provide care for private enrollees of 
higher-paying health plans rather than for Medicare beneficiaries. 
…[C]ompetition in the marketplace benefits Medicare and the Shared Savings 
Program because it promotes quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries and 
131 Id.
132  Proposed Statement, supra note xx at 21,898. 
133  Final Rule, supra note xx at 67,841. 
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protects beneficiary access to care. Furthermore, competition benefits the Shared 
Savings Program by allowing the opportunity for the formation of two or more 
ACOs in an area. Competition among ACOs can accelerate advancements in 
quality and efficiency. All of these benefits to Medicare patients would be 
reduced or eliminated if we were to allow ACOs to participate in the Shared 
Savings Program when their formation and participation would create market 
power.134
 In its Final Rule however, CMS and the agencies withdrew the mandatory review 
requirement.  Without fully crediting any particular objection, CMS noted a number of criticisms 
it had received. Some commenters claimed mandatory review conferred unreviewable authority 
on the antitrust agencies to disqualify entities from participating in the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program which is subject to the regulatory oversight of HHS alone. According to this line of 
argument the transfer of oversight violated a rarely-invoked administrative law principle, the 
subdelegation doctrine.135  Others objected that the process converted antitrust review into a 
regulatory process, imposed entry-inhibiting costs on ACOs, and unduly focused regulators‟ 
attention on market structure rather than conduct.136 On the other hand, some comments, 
primarily from third party payors, argued that the mandatory review policy should be 
strengthened, such as by setting the PSA market level requiring review at 40% or favoring ACOs 
without market power until the agency had enough experience to calibrate and refine the 
program.137
 Without acknowledging the merits of the subdelegation arguments or other concerns, 
CMS chose to abandon mandatory review, stating that it believed it could accomplish its 
announced objectives through a three-pronged, “less burdensome approach.”138  First, the 
antitrust agencies will make available an expedited voluntary program for reviewing antitrust 
problems raised by any ACO applicant. Second, CMS promised to provide the Antitrust 
Agencies aggregate claims data which will assist the Antitrust Agencies in calculating PSA 
shares for ACOs participating in the Shared Savings Program and will require newly formed 
ACOs to agree, as part of their application to participate in the MSSP to share their MSSP 
application with the Antitrust Agencies.139 Third, the antitrust agencies would “rely on existing 
enforcement processes for evaluating concerns…and filing antitrust complaints when 
appropriate.”140 Perhaps acknowledging it had served some pretty weak tea, CMS opened the 
door for coordinating with the antitrust agencies scrutiny of competition issues in the future.  The 
Final Rule states that CMS has requested that the Antitrust Agencies “conduct a study examining
how ACOs participating in the Shared Savings Program have affected the quality and price of 
134  Final Rule, supra note 7 at 67,841. 
135  Richard D. Raskin, Ben J. Keith & Brenna E. Jenny, Delegation Dilemma: Can HHS Required 
Medicare ACOs to Undergo Pre-Clearance by the Antitrust Agencies?, 20 HEALTH L. REP. 961 (2011). 
136  Final Rule, supra note xx at yy. 
137 Id.
138  Final Rule, supra note 7 at 67,843.  The Final Rule did not acknowledge the validity of the 
subdelegation argument or address whether alternatives short of expressly delegating preapproval such as 
obtaining evaluative reports from the antitrust agencies was considered.   
139  Final Rule, supra note 7 at 67,842. 
140 Id. 
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health care in private markets,” anticipating possible use of the study “to evaluate whether we 
should, in the future, expand our eligibility criteria so that we consider competition concerns 
more explicitly in the Shared Savings Program application review process.”141
Roads Not Taken
As discussed in the foregoing sections, the Final Rule did little to protect private markets 
from potentially harmful spillovers resulting from the development of ACOs under the MSSP.  
We have seen that antitrust enforcement provides no relief from the lawful exercise of extant 
market power.  Further, claims of foreclosure of competition by tying, bundling, and 
exclusionary contracting involve some unsettled issues of law and require extensive factual 
investigation.  It was therefore unrealistic to expect antitrust enforcement to provide a timely or 
dependable bulwark against the exercise of market power as ACO‟s form and establish 
themselves in local markets.  Given the serious prospects of cost shifting and spillovers in private 
insurance markets, a prophylactic, regulatory approach would have been desirable. This section 
discusses some of the missed opportunities and remaining options for competition-improving 
regulation. 
The most direct path would have been to impose ex ante requirements aimed at 
preventing anticompetitive behaviors.  This appraisal could have occurred at the screening stage 
of MSSP applicants and applied where the review revealed marginally excessive concentration 
or problematic agreements among participants in an ACO.  However, foregoing mandatory 
review severely undermined the antitrust agencies‟ leverage to insist on preconditions.  Lacking 
the gatekeeping power that follows from requiring agency clearance, the FTC and Department of 
Justice were denied the opportunity to negotiate binding conditions of participation as is 
commonly done in consent decrees in merger cases.142  For example, CMS might have imposed 
various regulatory conditions for MSSP participation such as heightened transparency or pre-
notification in close cases that could have reduced risks of anticompetitive conduct or better 
positioned the antitrust agencies to undertake timely enforcement actions. 
 A further problem with the approach to provider dominance in the Final Rule and Final 
Statement is that the antitrust agencies‟ MSSP scrutiny focuses only collaborations of otherwise 
independent providers. Other than requiring nonexclusive contracting in some circumstances and 
the four warnings on conduct, the rule does not require any special review of ACOs formed by 
dominant providers or where dominance is the result of mergers rather than collaborative 
contracting.  As one commenter pointed out, this places asymmetric administrative burdens on 
smaller ACOs seeking to enter into acceptable collaborative arrangements, and may perversely 
141  Final Rule, supra note xx at 67,843. 
142 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 12-16 
(2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf (discussing a “panoply” of 
conduct remedies that may be used to preserve competition especially in vertical merger cases, including 
provisions requiring “firewalls,” non-discrimination, mandatory licensing, transparency, nonexclusive 
contracting).  
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encourage the independent providers to consolidate into a larger single entity (or in the case of 
physicians, to seek employment with hospitals).143  Indeed  a policy that more closely scrutinizes 
mergers and favoring collaborations by smaller providers rather than mergers or employment 
relationships would have the pro-competitive virtue of leaving open the possibility that 
individual providers might at some point withdraw and form new networks or rivalrous ACOs. 
Intermediate regulatory options were also available. Commenters on Proposed Rule 
suggested a number of steps that CMS might take to reduce the risks of anticompetitive harm 
from dominant provider ACOs.  For example, several suggested ways to improve detection and 
analysis of competitive conditions such as collaborative data collection by CMS and the antitrust 
agencies, mandating public reporting on the cost and price of care, and close monitoring of 
provider pricing in commercial markets. 144 Another means of promoting competitive bargaining 
would be to require monopoly hospitals, on request of buyers, to unbundle their competitive 
services in negotiations with employers or payers. As suggested in a path-breaking article by 
Professors Havighurst and Richman, requiring hospitals to separate offerings of monopolized 
services from the “cluster market” of competitively-supplied acute care services would preserve 
a competitive market for services that are not monopolized and would make more transparent the 
pricing in services dominated by a single provider.145 Payers could then bargain down the prices 
of those services having good substitutes and might be able to encourage pricing restraint or 
growth of competitive alternatives for the monopolized services.146  While antitrust litigation 
might be directed to achieving this result,147 other options would offer more immediate and 
comprehensive relief.  For example, state health insurance exchanges or state regulators might 
require unbundling on a targeted or across the board basis and CMS pursuant to its review the 
performance of ACOs and their impact on commercial markets might impose similar 
requirements.148
Another issue amenable to increased regulatory oversight is exclusive contracting by 
ACO providers.  Preventing exclusive arrangements by dominant providers is a crucial 
component of a pro-competitive ACO policy.149  Without it, many ACO would readily achieve 
de facto dominance by virtue of their preexisting market power of their key providers, something 
that has become commonplace in most markets.150  At the same time, exclusive contracting can 
be a vital pro-competitive ingredient where providers do not have market power, as it generally 
143  Letter from Harold D. Miller, Executive Director, Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform, 
to Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Federal Trade Commission (May 31, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/aco-comments/00040-60100.pdf. 
144  Final Rule, supra note xx at 67,948. 
145 Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care, 89 Or. L. 
J. 847 (2011).
146 Id. at 867. 
147 Id.
148 See generally,  Thomas L. Greaney, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee 
on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet (May 18, 2012) 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/Greaney%2005182012.pdf.   
149 See supra notes xx and accompanying text. 
150 See supra notes xx and accompanying text. 
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encourages long term investments of human and financial capital in the enterprise. The Final 
Rule conditions safety zone treatment on all any hospital or ambulatory surgery center being 
non-exclusive to the ACO.151 The rule of non-exclusivity also applies to rural hospitals or 
dominant providers for ACOs that seek to qualify under the rural and dominant provider 
exceptions. The test for nonexclusivity, drawn from the Agencies Health Care Policy Statements 
is that an ACO must be “non-exclusive in fact and not just in name,” evidenced by a showing 
that providers actually individually participate in, or contract with, other networks or managed 
care plans; evidence of their willingness and incentive to do so; and evidence that they earn 
substantial revenue from other networks or through individual contracts with managed care 
plans.152  While these criteria may prove useful in a mature market, it is difficult to see how they 
can be applied ex ante in the ACO context.153 A more fruitful approach would be to establish by 
regulation preconditions for ACO approval that include clear commitments to participate in other 
networks with financial penalties, termination or nonrenewal for noncompliance.  
On a more prescriptive path, several options are available.  CMS could make more 
explicit that it is likely to deny renewal of authority for ACOs to participate in the MSSP where 
it finds evidence of spillovers in the form of price increases and cost shifting to the private sector 
resulting from market power.  Perhaps the boldest move would have been to bar ACOs from 
participation in the MSSP that materially increased concentration or threatened to dominate their 
markets until entry by other ACOs occurred.154  Faced with delayed entry, providers might then 
realign to permit formation of multiple ACOs.  Although this approach admittedly imposes short 
term losses to the Medicare program, it arguably prevents long term damage to local provider 
markets of considerably greater magnitude and duration.155  That is, vertical and horizontal 
151  Final Rule, supra note xx at 67,841. See also Final Policy Statement, supra note xx at 67,028 (citing 
standards set forth in the agencies‟ 1996 Health Policy Statements DOJ & FTC Health Policy Statements 
supra note xx at yy); Id. at 67,029 (to fall within a safety zone, ACOs with a dominant participant “cannot 
require a private payer to contract exclusively with the ACO or otherwise restrict a private payer‟s ability 
to contract or dealt with other ACOs or provider networks”).
152 Id. at yy. 
153 The FTC‟s experience applying this standard in evaluating physician networks suggests that 
exclusivity will be rarely found absent explicit agreements. See Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude, supra
note 109 at 199. 
154 See Letter from Joseph M. Miller and Michael Spector, Counsel, America‟s Health Insurance Plans, to 
Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice (May 31, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/aco-comments/00109-60306.pdf (parenthetical); Letter from Paul 
Markovich, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Blue Shield of California, to 
Secretary, Federal Trade Commission (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/aco-
comments/00029-60085.pdf (parenthetical) available at www.ftc.gov/os/comments/aco-comments, others. 
155  One commenter compared the estimated national cost savings that Medicare may realize from the 
MSSP, (approximately $510 million over three years) to the total annual operating revenues for hospitals in 
one medium sized city ($7 billion).  A small price increase caused by enhanced provider market power in 
countless markets around the country obviously would impose societal costs that dwarf losses to the 
Medicare program.  Joe Miller, The Proposed Accountable Care Organization Guidance: A First Look
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consolidation in provider markets stimulated by the MSSP is likely to have adverse effects on 
price and quality in private markets without being susceptible to effective antitrust remedies. In  
Conclusion 
Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes—Oscar Wilde156
Much hangs on the success of the ACO experiment.  The Affordable Care Act enjoys only a thin 
margin of popular support and has no other tool to spur rapid change in health care delivery. This article 
has identified an unfortunate administrative impasse that forestalled a cooperative regulatory approach to 
deal with the core issue of provider concentration.  Why did a cross platform regulatory solution fail 
to emerge?  A partial explanation described in this article is found in the divergence between the 
legal responsibilities and cultures of the agencies.  CMS serves a classically regulatory function, 
overseeing quality, price and performance of providers using a variety of entry and command 
and control tools, and improvidently ignored the programs effects on private markets.   The 
antitrust agencies rely largely on adjudicatory enforcement, supplemented by extensive use of 
advisory opinions and compliance guidelines. Antitrust enforcers are predisposed to abjure ex 
post regulation of the conduct of dominant market participants, preferring ex ante structural 
remedies. This mismatch of regulatory perspectives has placed private payors and the Medicare 
program at the mercy of dominant providers.  
This article has sought to demonstrate that in order to effectively promote competition 
through ACOs and prevent harm to private markets it is necessary to police dominant providers, 
which in turn requires a degree of prescriptive regulation.  Of course it is true that the MSSP is at 
the starting point of a learning curve. It is certainly possible that experience and data flowing 
from the initial round of ACO contracts will embolden regulators and Congress to undertake 
measures that attempt to deal with provider market power.  Unfortunately for those who place 
their hopes on market solutions to health care costs, the next phase may result in more draconian 
regulation than would otherwise have been necessary.
Health Affairs Blog (April 14, 2011) http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/04/14/the-proposed-accountable-
care-organization-antitrust-guidance-a-first-look/. 
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